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Abstract
Background: In 2005, the Indian Government introduced the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) scheme - a conditional
cash transfer program that incentivizes women to deliver in a health facility – in order to reduce maternal and
neonatal mortality. Our study aimed to measure and explain socioeconomic inequality in the receipt of JSY benefits.
Methods: We used prospectively collected data on 3,682 births (in 2009–2010) from a demographic surveillance system
in five districts in Jharkhand and Odisha state, India. Linear probability models were used to identify the determinants of
receipt of JSY benefits. Poor-rich inequality in the receipt of JSY benefits was measured by a corrected concentration
index (CI), and the most important drivers of this inequality were identified using decomposition techniques.
Results: While the majority of women had heard of the scheme (94% in Odisha, 85% in Jharkhand), receipt of JSY
benefits was comparatively low (62% in Odisha, 20% in Jharkhand). Receipt of the benefits was highly variable by district,
especially in Jharkhand, where 5% of women in Godda district received the benefits, compared with 40% of women in
Ranchi district. There were substantial pro-rich inequalities in JSY receipt (CI 0.10, standard deviation (SD) 0.03 in Odisha; CI
0.18, SD 0.02 in Jharkhand) and in the institutional delivery rate (CI 0.16, SD 0.03 in Odisha; CI 0.30, SD 0.02 in Jharkhand).
Delivery in a public facility was an important determinant of receipt of JSY benefits and explained a substantial part of the
observed poor-rich inequalities in receipt of the benefits. Yet, even among public facility births in Jharkhand, pro-rich
inequality in JSY receipt was substantial (CI 0.14, SD 0.05). This was largely explained by district-level differences in wealth
and JSY receipt. Conversely, in Odisha, poorer women delivering in a government institution were at least as likely to
receive JSY benefits as richer women (CI −0.05, SD 0.03).
Conclusion: JSY benefits were not equally distributed, favouring wealthier groups. These inequalities in turn reflected
pro-rich inequalities in the institutional delivery. The JSY scheme is currently not sufficient to close the poor-rich gap in
institutional delivery rate. Important barriers to institutional delivery remain to be addressed and more support is needed
for low performing districts and states.
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Background
Universal Health Coverage, defined as ensuring that
everyone has access to affordable and quality health care,
features high on the policy agenda of many low and
middle income countries. While the focus on maternal
and child health (MCH) in the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG) has brought about much progress in the
coverage of MCH care, many countries are lagging be-
hind on MDG 4 and 5, in particular with respect to re-
ducing neonatal and maternal mortality [1]. This has
much to do with the difficulties of increasing the rate of
institutional deliveries, especially among the poorest
population groups within countries. Possible barriers for
using delivery care can be financial, cultural, or know-
ledge related. Both demand side programs such as con-
ditional cash transfers, vouchers and user fee removals,
and supply side programs such as performance based fi-
nancing, are increasingly being implemented to increase
the coverage of MCH care [2–5].
In India, the bulk of health care is still financed by
out-of-pocket payments made at the point of health care
use, leading to problems of inaccessibility and lack of fi-
nancial protection [5]. In India, progress towards MDG4
and 5 has been modest; neonatal mortality has fallen
from 44 per 1000 live births in 2001 to 38 per 1000 live
births in 2005 and 28 per 1000 live births in 2015. Ma-
ternal mortality is still high with 280 per 100,000 and
174 per 100,000 live births in 2005 and 2015, respect-
ively [6]. Data from the latest Demographic Health Sur-
vey (2005) indicates that only 40% of women deliver in
an institution [7]. Socioeconomic inequalities in MCH
have remained high in the past decade [8].
With the aim of reducing neonatal and maternal mor-
tality and reducing out-of-pocket payments associated
with institutional delivery, the Indian Government intro-
duced the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) scheme in 2005.
JSY is a conditional cash transfer program that finan-
cially rewards pregnant women for delivery, and espe-
cially for delivery in a facility that is empanelled by JSY.
Even though the scheme is centrally sponsored, eligibil-
ity criteria vary by state. The poorest (low performing)
states target all women, while in high performing (less
poor) states, only women holding a Below Poverty Line
(BPL) card are eligibility. Some states require that deliv-
ery takes place in a public facility, while other states
(such as Odisha) also have accredited private providers
[9]. Hospital delivery in a government facility should in
theory be free of charge. Free transport to facility should
also be available for pregnant women and newborns in
both states. It is likely however that these services are
not always free in practice, and there may still be other
costs associated with delivery in a facility. In Jharkhand,
during the study period, women also received a small
amount of money for home deliveries.
With JSY being one of the largest conditional cash
transfer programs worldwide [5], a considerable number
of studies have sought to establish its impact on the pro-
portion of women delivering in a facility. Most notably,
Lim et al. (2010) found JSY to have a large positive impact
on the institutional delivery rate (an increase of 43–49%
in the probability of women delivering in a facility), lead-
ing to important reductions in neonatal mortality (a re-
duction of 2.3 neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births) [10].
These large effects have, however, been questioned by
Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) and Joshi and Sivaram (2014)
who suggested that, despite an increase in use of mater-
nity health services, there was no effect of JSY on
maternal and neonatal health due to the low quality of
care provided in public facilities [11, 12]. Some studies
investigating heterogeneity of the effect of JSY on use of
maternity care across socioeconomic groups found that
poorer, less educated women and those belonging to
Scheduled Castes or Tribes (as defined by the Indian Con-
stitution) generally benefit more from JSY [11, 13, 14].
Yet, these studies do not describe and explain socioeco-
nomic inequalities in JSY receipt in detail.
In this study, we aimed to measure the magnitude of
socioeconomic inequality in the receipt of JSY benefits
and explain these inequalities using the decomposition
method. We use data that was prospectively collected
through a demographic surveillance system in the states
of Jharkhand and Odisha.
Methods
Data
We used data from a population surveillance system in
five districts in the states of Jharkhand and Odisha, two
of the poorest states in India (Godda, Khunti, and Ran-
chi district in Jharkhand, and Mayurbhanj and Rayagada
district in Odisha). Data were only collected in three out
of 24 districts in Jharkhand and in two out of 30 districts
in Odisha. The surveillance system was set up as part of
a scale-up of a community-based women’s group inter-
vention to reduce neonatal mortality and improve ma-
ternal and neonatal health. The intervention had proven
to be successful in a cluster randomised trial in Jhar-
khand and Odisha, and had been scaled up to five dis-
tricts in these states that were not part of the original
trial. The ‘scale-up area’ was divided into an intervention
area in which women’s groups were set up, and a control
area, in which no women’s groups were initially set up
(at a later stage, this control area for the scale-up be-
came the site of a new randomised trial with women’s
groups facilitated by government community health
workers (ASHAs)) [15]. We analysed the data for the
control arm of the scale-up area, including births in the
period 1 January 2009 (when the surveillance system
was set up) until 31 August 2010 (after which women’s
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groups were set up in the control area as part of the
new trial). The control area consisted of 25 clusters in
five districts, with a total population of around 35,000
(around 7000 per district). Of the study population,
20,000 were intensively monitored, collecting informa-
tion on vital outcomes and secondary outcomes includ-
ing receipt of JSY benefits. For the remaining 15,000
population, only data on vital outcomes and a limited
set of secondary outcomes, not including JSY uptake,
were collected. We analysed the data for the population
that was intensively monitored, which gave us a sample
of 3682 births.
The main outcome variable of interest reflects whether
or not the woman received JSY benefits for her delivery
during the study period (1/0) representing the uptake of
JSY. Other outcomes include the uptake of at least three
antenatal care visits (ANC3) and delivery in a public
facility1.
Our main socioeconomic variable of interest is eco-
nomic status, using a wealth index derived from princi-
pal component analysis on a range of asset variables as
proxy2. Second, we have an indicator for whether the in-
fant’s mother belongs to a Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled
Caste (ST/SC), who represent the most socioeconomi-
cally disadvantaged groups, recognized by the Constitu-
tion of India [16, 17]. Third, we define an indicator for
illiteracy reflecting whether or not the infant’s mother
can read and write (1/0), as verified by the interviewer.
Other covariates include demographics (age, number
of previous pregnancies) and geographical characteristics
(district indicators).
Measuring socioeconomic inequality
Next to summarizing JSY uptake across wealth quintiles,
we also measured socioeconomic inequality in the up-
take of JSY using a concentration index, which takes into
account inequality across the full socioeconomic distri-
bution. Erreygers [18] has argued that the standard con-
centration index has some shortcomings when applied
to bounded variables, most importantly that the bounds
of the index are dependent of the mean of the indicator.
We therefore applied the corrected concentration index
(CCy ) which, for our binary outcome of JSY receipt (yiÞ
, is calculated as:
CCy ¼ 8cov yi⋅Rið Þ ð1Þ
where Ri reflects a woman i’s fractional rank in the so-
cioeconomic distribution. This corrected index shares
the same interpretation as the standard concentration
index. Negative values imply that JSY uptake is more
concentrated among poorer women. If all women, irre-
spective of their socioeconomic status, are equally likely
to receive JSY benefits, the index would equal to zero,
and (iii) transferring JSY uptake from a richer to a
poorer woman reduces the value of the index [18].
Determinants of JSY uptake
To identify the important determinants of JSY uptake,
we ran several linear probability models3. First, we ran a
model of JSY uptake (yi ) only on the wealth quintile in-
dicators (model 1). Next we added household/mother
covariates and district indicators (model 2). Thereafter
we added an indicator for whether the child was born in
a public facility – one of the most important conditions
for eligibility for JSY benefits (model 3). Finally we esti-
mated model 2 only on the sample of births that took
place in a government facility (model 4).
Decomposition of socioeconomic inequalities in JSY
uptake
Having established the determinants of JSY uptake, we
wanted to identify the most important drivers of socio-
economic inequality in JSY uptake. If we assume that
JSY uptake can be written as a linear function of K de-
terminants xk ,
yi ¼ αþ
XK
k¼1βkxik þ εi; ð2Þ
the corrected concentration index can be written as a
weighted average of the concentration indices of the co-
variates (Cxk Þ :
CCy ¼ 4
XK
k¼1βkxkCxk þ GCε
h i
ð3Þ
Where xk is the mean of x, and GCε is the generalized
concentration index of the residuals. Equation (3) illus-
trates that for a covariate to contribute to socioeconomic
inequality in JSY uptake it needs to be associated with
JSY uptake (βkÞ and be unequally distributed across so-
cioeconomic status (Cxk Þ [18, 19].
These decompositions were performed for models (2),
(3) and (4) as introduced in the previous section. All
analyses were performed in Stata 12. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering on the primary sampling unit.
Results
Summary statistics
Table 1 shows the means of our covariates. The charac-
teristics of women were largely similar in the two states,
except for a higher percentage of women from Sched-
uled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in Odisha (86%) than in
Jharkhand (62%). In Jharkhand, there were considerable
district-level differences in the characteristics of the
study participants. The percentage of women from
Scheduled Casts or Scheduled Tribes varied from 49% in
Godda to 91% in Kunthi, and the number of previous
pregnancies varied from 1.4 in Ranchi to 1.9 in Khunti.
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Between-district differences in literacy rate were large in
both states. Poor-rich differences in the above character-
istics were also large in both states. Richer women had
on average 1 previous pregnancy, compared with 2 preg-
nancies among poorer women. Furthermore, the
illiteracy rate and percentage belonging to a Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe was substantially lower among
the richest quintile in both states. Differences in house-
hold wealth between districts were especially large in
Jharkhand, and much smaller in Odisha (Fig. 1a and b).
Table 2 shows average awareness and receipt of JSY
benefits across the two states and districts within each
state, and across wealth quintiles within each state. The
vast majority of women had heard of the scheme (94%
in Odisha, 85% in Jharkhand). There was some district-
level variation in Odisha, where only 62% of women in
Khunti had heard of JSY, compared with 97% in Ranchi.
While poor-rich inequalities in awareness were small in
Odisha, there was some pro-rich inequality in Jharkhand
(CI = 0.18, SD 0.02).
The percentage of women that received JSY benefits
was low in comparison with the percentage of women
that had heard of the scheme, especially in Jharkhand.
While 62% of women received the benefits in Odisha,
only 20% did so in Jharkhand. In the latter state, uptake
of JSY benefits ranged from 5% in Godda to 40% in
Ranchi, while such regional differences were small in
Odisha. In both states, the receipt of JSY benefits was
disproportionally concentrated among better-off women
(CI: 0.18 in Jharkhand, 0.10 in Odisha).
Women who took up the benefits, received about
1400 Rs. on average, but reported amounts were some-
what lower in Jharkhand (1222 Rs.). There was little so-
cioeconomic inequality in the amount received, although
in Jharkhand women in the lowest quintile reported re-
ceiving on average 265 Rs. less than those in the highest
Table 1 Summary statistics of covariates and distribution across districts and socioeconomic status
Age (years) Number of previous
pregnancies
Scheduled tribe / scheduled caste
(%)
Illiteracy rate (%)
Odisha Jharkhand Odisha Jharkhand Odisha Jharkhand Odisha Jharkhand
Total population 24.9 24.9 1.8 1.6 86 62 69 69
By district
Mayurbhanj 23.9 1.7 91 56
Rayagada 26.1 1.9 81 83
Godda 23.9 1.6 49 78
Khunti 26.4 1.9 91 77
Ranchi 24.9 1.4 56 54
By wealth group
Poorest quintile 25.5 25.1 2.4 1.8 93 68 87 90
Second poorest quintile 25.5 25.4 2.1 1.9 88 70 82 88
Middle quintile 24.5 25.4 1.6 1.8 92 69 78 77
Second richest quintile 24.4 24.6 1.4 1.5 89 57 63 63
Richest quintile 24.2 23.7 1.1 1.1 68 44 30 29
Concentration index (SD) −0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00) −0.16 (0.02) −0.10 (0.01) −0.17 (0.02) −0.21 (0.02) −0.45 (0.03) −0.49 (0.02)
Notes: Table shows the standard concentration index for continuous variables (age, number of previous pregnancies) and the corrected concentration index for
bounded variables (scheduled tribe/scheduled caste, illiteracy rate)
Fig. 1 Distribution of household wealth across districts in Odisha (a) and Jharkhand (b). Notes: Figures show the proportion of children in each
wealth quintile in each district, by state
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wealth quintile. These lower amounts for Jharkhand are
arguably explained by the higher proportion of home
births (4% in Jharkhand versus 2% in Odisha) and the
small benefits associated with home deliveries.
The above patterns of inequality in the receipt of JSY
benefits reflect inequalities in uptake of maternity care
(Table 3). In Jharkhand, the overall uptake of maternity
care was lower, and inequalities between districts and
wealth groups were larger, than in Odisha. In Jharkhand,
only 26% of women made at least 3 antenatal care visits
and 27% of women delivered in a facility. While district
level differences were small in Odisha, they were large in
in Jharkhand (8–55% for deliveries in government facil-
ities and 17–44% for 3ANC). In both states, the majority
Table 2 Summary statistics of JSY-related outcomes and their distribution
Heard (%) Received (%) Total amount (Rs.)
Odisha Jharkhand Odisha Jharkhand Odisha Jharkhand
Total population 94 85 62 20 1402 1222
By district
Mayurbhanj 95 59 1405
Rayagada 93 66 1400
Godda 87 5 944
Khunti 62 13 808
Ranchi 97 40 1343
By wealth group
Poorest quintile 91 71 56 11 1398 1015
Second poorest quintile 95 81 62 16 1394 1101
Middle quintile 94 86 59 15 1392 1290
Second richest quintile 96 92 64 25 1418 1256
Richest quintile 96 92 71 33 1408 1280
Concentration index (SD) 0.04 (0.02) 0.18 (0.02) 0.10 (0.03) 0.18 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.01)
Total sample (N) 1345 2337 1345 2337 836 470
Notes: Table shows the standard concentration index for continuous variables (amount) and the corrected concentration index for bounded variables (having
heard about JSY, having received JSY benefits). Total amount received in Indian Rupee (Rs.) was estimated among women who received JSY benefits
Table 3 Summary statistics of maternity care-related outcomes and their distribution
ANC3 (%) Institutional delivery (%)
Odisha Jharkhand All Public Private
Odisha Jharkhand Odisha Jharkhand Odisha Jharkhand
Total population 49 26 73 27 64 20 9 7
By district
Mayurbhanj 44 75 74 2
Rayagada 54 71 53 17
Godda 10 17 12 5
Khunti 8 17 12 5
Ranchi 55 44 34 10
By wealth group
Poorest quintile 36 11 65 17 60 13 6 4
Second poorest quintile 43 15 70 17 60 14 9 3
Middle quintile 49 15 68 17 62 14 6 3
Second richest quintile 52 33 76 32 67 27 9 5
Richest quintile 67 57 87 53 73 34 14 20
Concentration index (SD) 0.25 (0.03) 0.37 (0.02) 0.16 (0.03) 0.30 (0.02) 0.11 (0.03) 0.19 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.11 (0.01)
Total sample (N) 1345 2337 1345 2337 1345 2337 1345 2337
Notes: Table shows the corrected concentration index
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of institutional deliveries took place in a public facility.
The percentage of private sector deliveries was only sub-
stantial for the richest quintile, especially in Jharkhand.
Determinants of JSY uptake
Table 4 presents the regression results of the differ-
ent models used to identify the determinants of JSY
uptake. Model (1) confirms the earlier described
patterns of pro-rich receipt of JSY benefits. These
poor-rich inequalities were largely explained by
district-level differences in JSY uptake and by char-
acteristics of the mother (Model 2). In Jharkhand,
the probability of receiving JSY benefits was highest
in Ranchi (33 percentage points (PP) higher than in
the reference district Godda) and five PP lower for
illiterate women than for literate women. In Odisha,
there were no statistically significant district level
differences in JSY receipt, but women who had had
more previous pregnancies were less likely to receive
JSY benefits (4 PP).
In Model 3, we added an indicator for government
facility delivery to the covariates. As delivery in a fa-
cility was a condition for receiving JSY benefits, and
there are few private hospitals empanelled in JSY. De-
livery in government facility was strongly associated
with JSY receipt in both states, although more so in
Odisha (64 PP, versus 37 PP in Jharkhand). In this
model, poor-rich inequalities in JSY receipt disap-
peared, but there still was substantial district level
heterogeneity. In Odisha, women from Rayagada were
21 PP more likely to receive JSY benefits than women
from Mayurbhanj; in Jharkhand, women from Ranchi
were 26 PP more likely to receive JSY benefits than
women from Godda. Model (4) is similar to model
(2) but only included births in government facilities.
Within this sample, the probability of receiving JSY
benefits only varied by district.
Decomposition of socioeconomic inequality in JSY uptake
Figure 2a and b graphically illustrate the results of
the decomposition of poor-rich inequality in JSY re-
ceipt as measured by the concentration index, for
models (2), (3) and (4) in Table 4 (detailed results
are available in the Appendix). The total height of
the bar represents the magnitude of poor-rich in-
equalities (CI of JSY receipt). Note that a variable
contributes to the CI both through its association
with JSY receipt (Table 4) and the extent to which it
is unequally distributed by household wealth
(Table 1). As model (2) and model (3) were esti-
mated on the same sample, the bars are equally
Table 4 Determinants of JSY uptake
Odisha Jharkhand
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Household wealth
Poorest (ref.)
2nd poorest 0.06b 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04b 0.00 0.01 −0.03
Middle 0.03 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.04 −0.03 −0.02 −0.00
2nd richest 0.08a 0.04 0.02 −0.02 0.14a 0.01 −0.01 −0.01
Richest 0.15c 0.09 0.04 −0.05 0.22c 0.04a 0.01 −0.06
Region
Mayurbhanj (ref.)
Rayagada 0.07 0.21c 0.14b
Godda (ref.)
Khunti 0.08 0.06a 0.27c
Ranchi 0.33c 0.26c 0.48c
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
Previous pregnancy −0.04b −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
ST/SC −0.02 0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.02a −0.03
Illiterate −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.05b −0.03a −0.04
Public-institutional delivery 0.64c 0.37c
Observations 1345 1344 1342 860 2335 2329 2315 469
Note: Table shows coefficients from linear probability models with JSY uptake as dependent variable. The fourth [4] model is only estimated on the sample of
women who delivered in a public facility
asignificant at 10% level, bsignificant at 5% level, csignificant at 1% level
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high. The decomposition using model (4) only in-
cluded births in a government facility.
Looking at Fig. 2a for Odisha, we see in the first
bar that household wealth was the most important
driver (43%) of poor-rich inequality in JSY uptake;
the second most important driver was the number of
previous pregnancies (34%). The latter contribution
was driven by the higher number of previous preg-
nancies among poorer women and the negative
association between the number of pregnancies and
JSY uptake. These contributions reduced substan-
tially after adding government facility delivery to the
model (second bar). Within the sample of govern-
ment facility deliveries (third bar), receipt of JSY
benefits was pro-poor (CI = −0.05, SD 0.03); poor
women were slightly more likely to obtain JSY bene-
fits than richer women.
In Jharkhand (Fig. 2b), we get quite a different
story, with district level differences explaining most of
the poor-rich inequalities in each of the decompos-
ition models (63, 47 and 60% in models (2), (3) and
(4) respectively). Even within the sample of govern-
ment facility deliveries, there was considerable pro-
rich inequality in JSY receipt (CI = 0.14 SD 0.05),
which was also driven by district level differences.
This can be explained by the fact that in Ranchi, the
richest district, women were far more likely to obtain
JSY benefits than in the other districts. Once these
district level differences were taken into account, JSY
uptake was more concentrated among the poor, which
explains the negative contribution of wealth to the
poor-rich inequalities in JSY uptake (−19%).
Discussion
Our analysis shows that inequalities in JSY receipt
are substantial in Jharkhand and Odisha, both be-
tween wealth groups and between districts within
states. In Jharkhand, these inequalities to some ex-
tent reflected differences in awareness of the scheme.
Nevertheless, the discrepancy between awareness and
receipt of benefits was very large in both states, es-
pecially in Jharkhand. Poor-rich inequalities in JSY
receipt reflected substantial pro-rich inequalities in
the institutional delivery rate. Yet, even among gov-
ernment facility deliveries there were considerable
pro-rich inequalities in JSY receipt in Jharkhand,
which were explained by district level differences in
poverty and receipt of JSY benefits. Conversely, in
Odisha, poorer women delivering in a government
institution were at least as likely to receive JSY ben-
efits as richer women.
There are some limitations to this study. First, the data
were not collected with the aim of evaluating JSY, so we
could not exactly identify whether women had fulfilled
all the necessary conditions to be eligible for JSY bene-
fits. We used delivery in a government facility as a
proxy, as this is the most important requirement. Sec-
ond, the data were only collected in a small number of
districts in both states. The large district level inequal-
ities in Jharkhand may reflect the fact that data were col-
lected in Ranchi district – the capital district- and two
rural districts, while in Odisha the capital city district
was not included. Third, our data relates to births in
2009 and 2010. While the implementation of the JSY
program may have improved in the mean-time, our
paper provides one of the most recent estimates avail-
able for JSY uptake across socioeconomic strata. Fourth,
given the cross sectional nature of our data, our models
only allow the identification of associations between co-
variates and JSY uptake, and should not be interpreted
as causal effects.
Our findings correspond with DLHS evidence that the
odds of receiving JSY benefits were not always highest
among the poor. Yet, the poor-rich inequalities in JSY
receipt that we report for Odisha and Jharkhand were
much larger than in these national level studies [5, 10].
Our finding of large between-state differences in
JSY uptake reflects a broader pattern of a highly
Fig. 2 Decomposition of socioeconomic inequality in JSY uptake in Odisha (a) and Jharkhand (b). Notes: The bars in each figure reflect absolute
contributions to inequality in JSY uptake using model [2], [3] and [4] in Table 4, respectively. In Odisha, CI of JSY uptake equals 0.10 the full sample
(model 2 and 3), and −0.05 for the sample of public deliveries (model 4). In Jharkhand, CI equals 0.18 and 0.14, respectively
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variable implementation process and substantial dif-
ferences in JSY uptake across states in the country.
Interestingly, Odisha was the next-highest performing
state in terms of JSY receipt in the country, and Jhar-
khand one of the lowest performing states, based on
2007–2009 DLHS data. We found that even within
states, indicators of JSY success were highly variable
between districts. Such differences could be due to
differences in accessible health infrastructure for facil-
ity delivery, but could also highlight differences in
state-level government capacity to implement national
level policies [10].
Implications
Our findings imply that the JSY scheme is currently
not sufficient to close the poor-rich gap in institu-
tional delivery rate. Low uptake is not so much re-
lated to low awareness of the scheme per se, but
rather with remaining barriers to institutional delivery
and, in Jharkhand, to district-level differences in per-
formance of the JSY scheme. This corresponds with
findings from another study, which reported that des-
pite receiving JSY benefits, many families still have to
borrow money to cover out of pocket expenditures.
Furthermore, non-monetary demand and supply side
barriers, including quality of care, distance, and a
tradition of home delivery remain [5]. The large dif-
ferences in receipt of JSY and uptake of maternity
care between Jharkhand and Odisha and between dis-
tricts within Jharkhand, suggest that more support is
needed for low performing districts and states.
Women giving birth in government facilities in Ran-
chi, the richest district, were much more likely to re-
ceive benefits as compared to those giving birth in
government facilities in other districts. This might re-
flect a better administration of the scheme in districts
with more resources. It is reassuring, though, that we
found that poor women were as likely to receive JSY
benefits as richer women when delivering in a gov-
ernment facility, after taking such district-level differ-
ences into account.
Our findings are in line with results from other evi-
dence looking at the equity in the uptake of cash incen-
tive schemes in neighboring countries of India. A review
of the evidence has revealed that the Safe Delivery In-
centive Programme in Nepal and the Maternal Health
Voucher scheme in Bangladesh failed to target poorer
households. The uptake of those schemes was more
concentrated among the better-off [20].
Conclusions
JSY benefits were not equally distributed, favouring
wealthier groups. These inequalities in turn reflected
pro-rich inequalities in the institutional delivery. The
JSY scheme is currently not sufficient to close the
poor-rich gap in institutional delivery rate. Important
barriers to institutional delivery remain to be addressed
and more support is needed for low performing district
and states.
Endnotes
1In Jharkhand, only deliveries in public facilities were
eligible for JSY benefits, while in Odisha also some pri-
vate facilities were included in the JSY scheme. Unfortu-
nately we do not know whether the private facilities
reported to have been used in our data are accredited by
JSY. Therefore, we cannot identify exactly whether
women have fulfilled all requirements to be eligible for
JSY benefits. In Jharkhand, where only births in govern-
ment facilities are eligible for JSY, we only found 13
births outside of government facilities that were given
the cash transfer of 1400 Rs. This does not suggest
major problems of leakage of the program.
2Assets include: mattress, bed, chair, table, pressure
cooker, electricity, fan, radio, television, clock, phone,
animal-drawn cart, bicycle, motor bicycle and agricul-
tural land ownership (small size, medium size, large size
and mortgage).
3We have confirmed robustness of results to using
probit models and estimating marginal effects. We
prefer to present the linear probability model as this
facilitates the decomposition technique that is used
later. Non-linear extensions of the decomposition
method do exist but require focusing on the latent
index rather than the actual uptake variable or im-
pose approximation errors (Vandoorslaer, Koolman
and Jones 2004) [21].
Appendix
Table 5 Decomposition of socioeconomic inequality in JSY
uptake in Odisha and Jharkhand
Odisha (%) Jharkhand (%)
[2] [3] [4] [2] [3] [4]
Household wealth 42.78 15.05 −55.01 14.68 2.14 −19.10
Region −0.30 −0.84 −11.50 63.17 46.92 59.83
Age −5.59 −2.96 −5.79 2.39 0.37 0.63
Previous pregnancy 34.34 10.31 2.91 −1.28 −1.47 −3.10
ST/SC 2.01 −1.86 5.36 −0.86 −2.41 2.51
Illiterate 8.47 10.64 10.95 11.89 7.56 8.23
Public-insitutional delivery 0.00 50.27 0.00 0.00 34.95 0.00
Error −6.51 −8.07 −8.48 5.72 4.18 6.60
In Jharkhand, women received JSY payments in installments. However, women
received 500 Rs. for home delivery event. This was continued during the data
collection period. Number of home delivery might have some influence in
reducing the average
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